In this paper, I present the discussive adaptive logic DLI r . As is the case for other discussive logics, the intended application context of DLI r is the interpretation of discussions. What is new about the system is that it does not lead to explosion when some of the premises are selfcontradictory. It is argued that this is important in view of the fact that human reasoners are not logically omniscient, and hence, that it may not be evident to discover the inconsistencies in one's beliefs. In addition to this, DLI r can handle cases in which different participants contradict each other. It is shown that, in both kinds of cases, DLI r leads to an interpretation of the discussion that is as rich as possible (even though no discussive connectives are introduced).
Introduction
The relations between modal logic and paraconsistency go back to 1948 when Stanis law Jaśkowski used a modal framework to introduce the notion of dis-cussive logics (also called discursive logics) which constitute the first family of formal paraconsistent logics. 1 As their name suggests, the inspiration for discussive logics originated from Jaśkowski's interest in the interpretation of discussions.
Suppose, with Jaśkowski, that one is trying to interpret a discussion in which some of the participants contradict each other. If one lumps together all the statements made, one risks arriving at triviality. So, how should one proceed? The most natural solution, according to Jaśkowski, is to interpret the conflicting statements in a modal way: "someone accepts A; someone accepts ∼A". From this, neither "someone accepts B" nor someone accepts "A∧∼A" follows, which is exactly what we want.
Thus, where Γ is the set of all statements made in the debate, it seems that inferences should be made, not from Γ, but from Γ ♦ = {♦A | A ∈ Γ}. This at once gives us the basic idea behind discussive logics. Where L is some modal logic and Γ ♦ = {♦A | A ∈ Γ}, a discussive logic DL, associated with L, is obtained by specifying the language of DL and by stipulating that
There is a catch, however. If one simply uses some standard modal logic to make inferences from Γ ♦ , one obtains an interpretation that is much too poor. For instance, if one would define DL as Γ DL A iff Γ ♦ S5 ♦A, then DL would not even validate Modus Ponens. This is why Jaśkowski dismissed the idea to formulate discussive logics in terms of the classical connectives (see [9, pp. 149-150] ). Instead, he proposed to define, in L, a number of "discussive connectives" that satisfy some or all of the valid schemes and rules of the positive fragment of CL. For instance, Jaśkowski's favorite discussive logic D 2 is obtained by defining a discussive conjunction, A ∧ d B = ♦A ∧ B, a discussive implication, A ⊃ d B = ♦A ⊃ B, and a discussive equivalence,
The language of D 2 is as that for CL, except that the classical conjunction as well as the material implication and equivalence are replaced by their discussive counterparts. The definition of D 2 is completed by stipulating that, where S5 d is S5 extended with the above definitions and where A and the members of Γ are well-formed formulas of
). This way out, however, has been criticized in a number of ways. Some have argued that there is no intuitive justification for the way in which modal operators sneak into the definitions of the implication and the conjunction; others have pointed out that the usual relations between the disjunction and the conjunction are lost (see the contributions in [14] for both criticisms).
A criticism of a different kind is that Jaśkowski's solution is inadequate with respect to the intended application context. When interpreting a debate, we assume that a statement is accepted by all participants in a debate, unless and until this assumption turns out to be mistaken. This is justified in view of the fact that participants are expected to object when they do not agree with some of the statements made. Hence, even if we are willing to 'isolate' statements that contradict each other, we tend to conjoin them unless and until they are proven to be inconsistent. Thus, if in a discussion A is asserted by some participant and B by another, we assume that all participants accept "A and B", unless and until proven otherwise. However, the discussive conjunction is inadequate to capture this. This is easily seen from the fact that, in D 2 , A ∧ d ∼A follows from A and ∼A.
In [13] , an alternative solution is proposed that meets each of these criticisms. The idea is that, instead of relying on a series of discussive connectives, a discussive system should validate the multiple-inference rules of CL 'as much as possible'. The logic presented in [13] is called DL r and is meant as an alternative for D 2 . Like D 2 , DL r incorporates the attractive properties of discussive logics: it is paraconsistent and does not allow to derive a (classical) contradiction (A ∧ ∼A) from an inconsistency (A, ∼A). However, unlike D 2 , DL r is entirely formulated in the language of CL.
Like all discussive logics, DL r is defined with respect to some modal logic, called AJ. So, where Γ ∪ {A} is a set of formulas of the predicative language of
The logic AJ is formulated within the adaptive logics programme. The first adaptive logic was designed by Diderik Batens around 1980 and was meant to interpret inconsistent theories 'as consistently as possible'.
3 Meanwhile a whole variety of adaptive logics is available-see [4] and [5] for recent surveys and introductions. Some of these handle logical abnormalities (such as inconsistency and negation-incompleteness). Others extend the usual deductive inference rules with some 'ampliative' ones (for instance, rules for abduction, enumerative induction, compatibility, . . . ). What all adaptive logics have in common, however, is that they define consequence relations that are dynamical and/or non-monotonic.
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The idea behind AJ is to assume that the participants in a debate agree with each other 'as much as possible'. Thus, where Γ stands for the statements made in some debate, it is assumed, for every A ∈ Γ, that A (everybody accepts A) is derivable from ♦A (someone accepts A), unless and until proven otherwise. Let us call this the unanimity presupposition. The resulting consequence relation is non-monotonic: conclusions drawn on the assumption that all participants agree with each other may be withdrawn when the latter is proven false.
As is the case for all adaptive logics, the semantics of AJ is obtained by selecting, for each set of premises, a subset of the models of some monotonic system (in this case the models of S5). Intuitively, those S5-models of Γ ♦ are selected that interpret Γ ♦ as much as possible in accordance with the unanimity presupposition. Thus, where Γ ♦ = {♦p, ♦∼p, ♦q}, some S5-models verify ♦q ∧ ♦∼q, others verify q. AJ selects the latter. As a consequence,
. This is as it should be: as there is no (explicit) disagreement with respect to q, all participants are supposed to accept q. Hence, as one of the participant accepts p, some of them accept p ∧ q.
Let me also put this somewhat more generally. Where ∃A stands for the existential closure of A, AJ selects those S5-models of Γ ♦ that verify not more formulas of the form ∃(♦A∧♦∼A) than is necessary for the truth of the members of Γ ♦ .
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As is argued in [13] , DL r leads to a more natural interpretation of discussions than D 2 . There is, however, one drawback that DL r shares with D 2 . If some member of Γ is self-contradictory, the system leads to triviality. Thus, DL r can handle cases in which different participants in a debate contradict each other, but is inadequate for cases in which some participants contradict themselves.
At first sight, this may seem an advantage rather than a disadvantage. After all, should a participant that contradicts him or herself not be considered as irrational (or at least non-rational)? And hence, should one not expect to obtain nonsensical results as long as self-contradictory sentences are included in the set of statements one considers?
There are, however, two important remarks to be made in this respect. The first is that humans are not logically omniscient. Consequently, discovering some inconsistency in one's own beliefs may be far from evident. The second is that, in a debate, it may be just as important to expose internal inconsistencies (one participant contradicting him or herself) as it is to expose external inconsistencies (different participants contradicting each other).
The aim of this paper is to generalize the logic from [13] to handle both internal and external inconsistencies. The resulting logic will be called DLI r . Like DL r , DLI r validates the multiple-premise rules of CL 'as much as possible'. It moreover warrants that self-contradictory premises do not lead to explosion. If no member of Γ is self-contradictory, then DLI r leads to exactly the same results as DL r . At first sight, the design of DLI r may seem obvious. Like all discussive logics, it should be formulated with respect to some modal logic. And, if it should validate Adjunction as much as possible, this modal logic should be adaptive. Now, if one wants to allow for (internal) inconsistencies, the latter cannot be defined with respect to S5. It seems, however, that all one needs is an S5-like version of some (standard) paraconsistent logic (that allows for the truth of A ∧ ∼A). 6 However, for reasons that will be explained in the next section, matters are not all that simple. If one simply allows for contradictions, one obtains an interpretation of the debate that is much too poor. The solution will be to interpret the individual statements as consistently as possible. As we shall see below, this also has the advantage that, if some statement is not self-contradictory, it is interpreted in exactly the same way as with AJ.
Technically, this will be realized by making a combination of two adaptive logics: an inconsistency-adaptive logic (that interprets the individual statements as consistently as possible) and one that is analogous to AJ (that interprets the different statements as 'unanimously' as possible).
I shall proceed as follows. After explaining why we need an inconsistencyadaptive logic (Section 2), I briefly discuss the inconsistency-adaptive logic P r and the monotonic paraconsistent logic P on which it is based (Section 3). Next, 5 The selection mechanism will be defined in more exact terms in Section 6. 6 I say that a paraconsistent logic is standard if the consequence relation defined by it is reflexive, transitive and monotonic.
I present an S5-like version of P that constitutes the basis for the two adaptive logics (Section 4). In Sections 5 and 6, I present the logics S5PI and S5PE. The first of these interprets the individual statements as consistently as possible and proceeds in terms of P r ; the second one is similar to AJ. The way in which both logics are combined to obtain DLI r is discussed in Section 7. I end with a short conclusion (Section 8).
For reasons of space, I shall only discuss the semantics of the different systems. In view of the results from [13] and from [4] , the design of the corresponding proof theories is rather straightforward.
The Problem
As is explained in the previous section, the discussive logic DL r is defined with respect to the modal adaptive logic AJ, and the latter is obtained by selecting, for each set of premises Γ ♦ , a subset of the S5-models of Γ ♦ . As no S5-model verifies a formula of the form ♦(A ∧ ∼A), AJ leads to triviality whenever one of the members of Γ is self-contradictory. Now, consider some paraconsistent logic PL in which A∧∼A does not lead to explosion, 7 and suppose that we define an S5-like version for it. Some models of the resulting logic, call it MPL, will verify ♦(A∧∼A). Hence, in order to obtain an alternative for AJ that can handle both internal and external inconsistencies, it seems sufficient to define the selection, not with respect to the S5-models of Γ ♦ , but with respect to its MPL-models. There is, however, an important problem with this approach. Standard monotonic logics invalidate Ex Falso Quodlibet by invalidating some of the inference rules of CL.
8 For instance, most standard paraconsistent logics invalidate Disjunctive Syllogism; those that do not necessarily invalidate Addition (A / A ∨ B).
9 As a consequence, basing the selection on the MPL-models of Γ ♦ , would in many cases result in an interpretation of the individual statements that is much too poor.
Consider, for instance, Γ ♦ = {♦(p ∧ (∼p ∨ q)), ♦(p ∧ ∼p)}. In that case, one of the participants is 'disagreeing' with him or herself concerning p. This, however, is the only disagreement. As a consequence, an MPL-model of Γ ♦ would be selected iff it verifies ♦p ∧ ♦∼p, but falsifies any other formula of the form ∃(♦A ∧ ♦∼A). But, if MPL is based on a paraconsistent logic that invalidates Disjunctive Syllogism, some MPL-models of Γ ♦ will satisfy this requirement while falsifying ♦q.
10 So, ♦q would not be an MPL-consequence of Γ ♦ . This does not seem justified, however. Even if one of the members of Γ ♦ is self-contradictory, ♦(p ∧ (∼p ∨ q)) is not. Hence, there is no reason why some of the S5-consequences should not be derivable from it. Or, put into 7 As an example, one may think of the full positive fragment of Classical Logic (possibly extended with A ∨ ∼A). 8 This does not necessarily hold true for some non-standard paraconsistent systems. In [6] , it is shown, for instance, that it is possible to design a proof procedure that only invalidates Ex Falso Quodlibet (while validating all other inference rules of CL). The price to be paid, however, is that the resulting consequence relation is not transitive. 9 An example of a standard paraconsistent logic that validates Disjunctive Syllogism can be found in [12] . 10 The example will be explained in more detail in Section 6. For the moment, note only that MPL-models that verify (p ∧ ∼p) verify all members of Γ ♦ , even if they falsify ♦q.
terms of the intended application context, the fact that one of the participants in the debate is maintaining a self-contradictory statement should not lead to an impoverished understanding of what the other participants are asserting.
The way out is to make sure that the individual statements are interpreted 'as consistently as possible'. As we shall see below, this may be realized by making a preliminary selection from the MPL-models (before the one in accordance with the unanimity presupposition). Intuitively, the preliminary selection warrants that, for every individual statement, there is a 'possible world' in which this statement is interpreted as consistently as possible. For instance, where Γ ♦ is as in the previous paragraph, only those MPL-models will be selected that include a world in which p ∧ (∼p ∨ q) is verified, but p ∧ ∼p is falsified, and hence, in which q is verified.
In this paper, I shall base the preliminary selection on the inconsistencyadaptive logic P r . As we shall see in the next section, P r is based on a very poor paraconsistent logic (one that invalidates Disjunctive Syllogism as well as all other 'negative' inference rules of CL). However, for all sentences that behave consistently, P r is just as rich as CL. P r is not the only inconsistency-adaptive logic currently available. It is chosen because, on the one hand, it is a paradigmatic example to understand the functioning of an inconsistency-adaptive logic and, on the other hand, it makes very little assumptions about the domain one is dealing with.
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3 The Logics P and P r The logic P r is an adaptive version of the standard paraconsistent logic P. 12 In a sense, P is the most straightforward paraconsistent logic that one can obtain from CL. Where the negation of CL is defined by (i) a consistency requirement (A and its negation cannot both be true) and (ii) a negation-completeness requirement (A and its negation cannot both be false), the paraconsistent negation of P is obtained by dropping (i) while retaining (ii).
The language L of P is as the standard predicative language for CL, except that it contains two symbols for negation: "∼" and "¬". The former stands for the paraconsistent negation, the latter is the standard negation of CL. The language also includes ⊥. In the premises, negation is formalized by "∼". The main function of "¬" is to simplify the meta-theoretic proofs.
Let S, C, P r , F and W stand for, respectively, the sets of sentential letters, individual constants, predicate letters of rank r, (open and closed) formulas, and wffs (closed formulas) of L.
To simplify the semantic handling of quantifiers, the language L is extended to the pseudo-language L + by introducing a set of pseudo-constants O that has at least the cardinality of the largest model one wants to consider. Let W + denote the set of wffs of L + (in which C ∪ O plays the role played by C in L) and let ∼ W + = {∼A | ∼A ∈ W + }. A P-model M is a couple D, v , in which D is a set and v an assignment function. Every such model is an interpretation of W + , and hence of W, which 11 Most inconsistency-adaptive logics lead to a somewhat richer consequence set than P r . They do so, however, by making several assumptions about the application context (for instance, that there are reasons to minimize the inconsistencies in some or other way). 12 The most complete presentation of P r may be found in [2] .
is what we are interested in. The assignment function v is defined by:
The valuation function, v M : W + −→ {0, 1}, determined by M is defined by:
A is true in a P-model M (M verifies A) iff v M (A) = 1; Γ P A iff all P-models that verify all members of Γ also verify A; P A (A is valid) iff it is verified by all P-models.
The semantics for P r is obtained in a rather straightforward way from that for P. Let Ω be the set of all formulas of the form ∃(A∧∼A) (where A ∈ F) and let Dab(∆) denote the disjunction (∆), in which ∆ ⊂ Ω. A formula is called a Dab-consequence of Γ iff it is of the form Dab(∆) and it is a P-consequence of Γ; it is called a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ iff it is a Dab-consequence of Γ, and Dab(∆ ) is not a Dab-consequence of Γ, for any ∆ ⊂ ∆.
If Dab{A 1 , . . . , A n } is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ, Γ provides the information that one of the A i behaves inconsistently without revealing which one does. So, it is sensible not to rely on the consistent behaviour of any of the A i (or, put somewhat differently, to consider all A i as 'unreliable'). This is the strategy P r is based on. The abnormal part of a P-model is defined by:
The set U (Γ) of formulas that are unreliable with respect to Γ is defined by:
For any set of premises Γ, those P-models are selected that verify an inconsistency only if it is unreliable with respect to Γ:
Note that it does not make sense to say that a P-model is reliable, but only that it is a reliable model of some set of premises Γ. Below, I shall sometimes use the term "P r -models of Γ" to refer to the reliable models of Γ. The semantic consequence relation is defined with respect to the selected models:
To see what the P r -semantics comes to, consider a simple propositional example. Let Γ be {p, q, ∼p ∨ ∼q, ∼p ∨ r, s, ∼s ∨ t}. In that case, there is only one minimal Dab-consequence of Γ, namely (p ∧ ∼p) ∨ (q ∧ ∼q). This teaches us that either p ∧ ∼p or q ∧ ∼q behaves inconsistently with respect to Γ. As it is not possible to establish which one, both are considered as unreliable. It follows that some selected models verify p ∧ ∼p and falsify r (if both p and ∼p are true, then, in view of C2.8, ∼p ∨ r is true, even if r is false). However, as s ∧ ∼s is reliable with respect to Γ, all selected models falsify s ∧ ∼s, and hence, verify t. So, r is not a P r -consequence of Γ, but t is. (I leave it to the reader to check that neither r nor t are P-consequences of Γ.)
The Modal Paraconsistent Logic S5P
In this section, I present a modal version of P which will form the basis for the adaptive logics discussed in the next sections. The relation between S5P and P is as that between S5 and CL.
Let L M be the standard modal language (including ⊥) and let An S5P-model is a couple M = Σ, M 0 in which Σ is a set of P-models and M 0 ∈ Σ. The valuation determined by an S5P-model M is defined by the following clauses:
A is true in an S5P-model M = Σ, M 0 (M verifies A) iff v M0 (A) = 1; Γ S5P A iff all S5P-models that verify all members of Γ also verify A; S5P A (A is valid) iff it is verified by all S5P-models.
Note that, in front of a modal operator, the paraconsistent negation behaves as the classical negation. As a consequence the usual relations between " " and "♦" are not preserved. For instance, as both A and ♦∼A may be true in the same S5P-model, some S5P-models verify A while falsifying ∼♦∼A. Note also that, for any S5P-model M = Σ, M 0 , α = β may be true in some members of Σ, while false in others. Hence, α = β does not entail α = β.
The Modal Adaptive Logic S5PI
In view of the intended application context, the logic S5PI is only defined with respect to sets of premises of the form Γ ♦ (where Γ ⊂ W). Semantically, it is obtained by selecting a subset of the S5P-models of Γ ♦ . The idea is that only those models are selected that interpret each individual member of Γ ♦ as consistently as possible.
Consider, for instance, Γ ♦ = {♦((p ∧ ∼p) ∧ (q ∧ (∼q ∨ r))), ♦(p ∧ (∼p ∨ s))}. In that case, some S5P-models of Γ ♦ falsify ♦r, others falsify ♦s. However, in any interpretation of (p ∧ ∼p) ∧ (q ∧ (∼q ∨ r)) that is as consistent as possible, r is true. Analogously, in any interpretation of p ∧ (∼p ∨ s) that is as consistent as possible, s is true. This suggests that an S5P-model M = Σ, M 0 of Γ ♦ should be selected only if, for every A ∈ Γ, some M ∈ Σ interprets A as consistently as possible. Translated into terms of the inconsistency-adaptive logic P r , this brings us to the following selection criterion:
Definition 5 An S5P-model M = Σ, M 0 is an S5PI-model of Γ ♦ iff, for every ♦A ∈ Γ ♦ , some M ∈ Σ is a P r -model of A.
problem in this respect is whether it is possible to design a direct characterization for DLI r (that is, one that does not proceed in modal terms).
